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Wages in the Federal and
Private Sectors
ABSTRACT
This study addresses the legal principle of "comparability" that ties
federal sector wages to wages in the private sector. We first examine
comparability by determining if workers with similar observed and unobserved
characteristics receive the same wages in each sector. Estimates based on data
from the 1982 CPS indicate males may have a slight wage advantage in the federal
sector. Female workers earn substantially more in the federal sector than in
the private sector. We then develop a choice—theoretic approach to the issue of
comparability by applying a simple supply argument: a cost-minimizing federal
employer would pay wages no higher than necessary to attract employees and
eliminate queues for federal jobs. If the market pays equalizing differences
for unique attributes of each sector, then this approach is not consistent with
wage equality between the sectors. A model jointly determining sectoral
attachment and wage offers is estimated by maximum likelihood. Results suggest
the elimination of queues will require substantial wage reductions for both male





I. Introduction and Overview
Pay comparability between the public and private sectors is supported by
both equity and efficiency arguments. Equity considerations dictate a worker do
no better or worse in the public sector than in the private sector. Efficiency
considerations imply the federal sector pay no more than is necessary to attract
an adequate supply of employees. Equal pay, it is presumed, will lead to "fair"
competition for workers between the public and private sectors.
Several previous studies have attempted to determine if equalpay in the
public sector has been attained. They have employed wage regressions to adjust
observed differentials for observed quality and productivity differencesamong
workers. Inability to "explain" pay differences by measured characteristics is
taken to be evidence that equal pay is not the rule. Unexplained or residual
differences in pay are interpreted as quasi-rents to employment in the higher
paying sector.
The present analysis addresses two alternative interpretations of the
"unexplained" difference between public and private wages. The first is
unobserved differences in the productivity of workers in each sector. Despite
the availability of large samples and detailed information in recent microdata
files, we can never fully capture all worker specific differences. If workers
are sorted between sectors on the basis of these unobserved factors the
unexplained component of wage regressions may be more properly interpreted as
individual differences rather than quasi-rents. One goal of the present
analysis is to extend the wage regression approach to adjust for the effects of
observed and unobserved productivity related personal characteristics.
The second alternative interpretation of the unexplained difference between
public and private sector wages is equalizing (or compensating) wage differences
for nonpecuniary job attributes. Workers may perceive fundamental differences
between the public and private sectors. Distinguishing features of each sector,Wages in the Federal and Private Sectors
The legal principle of "comparability" has formally guided federal
white-collar wage policy for the last 20 years. The legislationrequires
"federal pay rates be comparable with private enterprisepay rates for the same
levels of work."' The principle has been interpreted and enforced toequalize
wages between the federal and private sectors. Recent evidence suggests this
objective has not been attained. Seminal work by Smith (1976, 1977, 1981) and
Quinn (1979) indicates federal workers may be "overpaid" relative to their
private sector counterparts by as much as 15 to 20 percent.
This paper makes two additional contributions to the comparability debate.
The first is another attempt to determine if federal and private sectorwages
are "equal" as mandated by current federal wage guidelines. Since individual
productivity differences are valid reasons for pay differences between sectors,
we extend the approach of Smith and Quinn to control for the effects of both
observed and unobserved worker quality in order to isolate residualwage
inequality between sectors.
The second contribution is an attempt to motivate a more choice-theoretic
treatment of public-private wage differences. This approach is based on a
simple supply interpretation of wage "comparability": as a cost-minimizing
employer the public sector would set wages just high enough to attract the
required work force. This interpretation appears to be the original motivation
for comparability legislation. The approach suggests that if there exist
equalizing differences in pay for nonpecuniary job attributes of each sector, a
policy of equal wages is inappropriate. To resolve the issue of a "comparable"
wage we develop and estimate a model of sectoral job attachment to identify the
wage differential consistent with this interpretation of comparability.—4—
determine whether the worker will be employed in the government sector. More
important, identification of the separate decisions permits a test for the
existence of queues for federal jobs by revealing excess desired demand for
government jobs at a given relative public-private wage.A related advantage of
directly specifying the sectoral attachment mechanism is that it can be
incorporated into the wage regression method to adjust observed differentials
for both observed and unobserved productivity characteristics.
Before preceeding one shortcoming of the model deserves mention. This
study focuses only on the wage component of pecuniary compensation. The
principle of comparability has only recently been applied to nonwage
compensation (Carow (1981)). Although the model does deal with nonwage job
attributes, the analysis is geared to those attributes, unlike fringe benefits,
that cannot be manipulated by employers. Of course the existence of positive
public—private wage differentials would be of less consequence if offset by
other forms of pecuniary compensation such as fringe benefits. However, there is
ample evidence this is not the case (Quinn (1979, 1982a, 1982b), Bellante and
Long (1981)). These studies suggest federal-private wage differentials may
understate total compensation differentials.
The results suggest wage equality between similar workers in the federal
and private sectors was not achieved in 1982. After adjusting for both observed
and unobserved productivity characteristics we find the federal wage structure
exceeds the private sector wage structure by about 4 percent for males and 22
percent for females. We also attempt to estimate the wage differential that
eliminates implicit queues for federal sector jobs. For the marginal worker this
is the wage differential that equalizes the attractiveness of total compensation
(wage and nonwage) packages offered by each sector. The estimates suggest
elimination of queues would be achieved by reducing federal wages for males
about 16 percent and federal wages for females by about 42 percent.-3-
which may be viewed either favorably or unfavorably by workers, include
stability of employment, opportunity for internal promotion, unique nature of
public service, pace of work, the bureaucratic work environment, etc.If the
"return" to a job is viewed as a package containing both wage and nonwage
components, then part of any public-private wage difference may be an equalizing
difference for the nonwage job attributes. If workers trade off wages for these
job attributes a policy of "equal wages" between sectors may lead to a federal
wage scale that neither equalizes overall "returns" to workers in each sector
nor elicits the appropriate supply response.
If wage differences between sectors are, in part, equalizing differences,
then how can one determine if the federal sector "overpays"? Unlike the problem
of unobserved productivity, the effects of equalizing differences cannot easily
be dealt with in a wage regression framework. In particular, the conventional
approach of standardizing wages for the effects of noriwage job attributes cannot
be applied because some of the fundamental differences between the federal and
private sectors (e.g. serving the public) cannot be easily measured.2 The
alternative approach adopted here is to judge whether the government "overpays"
based on implicit queues for public sector jobs. If the difference between
public and private wage offers exceeds the equalizing difference in pay
necessary to offset the difference between noriwage job aspects, then more
individuals will desire government employment than there are public sector jobs.
The wage differential that "just" eliminates the queue is, in a simply supply
sense, the "comparable" wage differential.
The present analysis formulates and estimates a model of sectoral
attachment at the individual level that permits rough calculation of the length
of implicit queues for federal sector jobs. We identify determinants of worker
preferences for federal sector employment and determinants of federal sector
hiring choices. The separate decisions of employee and employer together—5—
Section 2 briefly outlines the objectives of comparability legislation and
the pay setting mechanism in the federal government. The following section
briefly reviews the wage regression approach and provides the motivation for the
empirical work that follows. Section 4 lays out the employer-employee matching
model that is central to our approach, and Section 5 discusses econometric
issues. The description of data sources and presentation of results are
contained in Sections 6 and 7 respectively. The findings are summarized in the
final section.
2. Setting Pay in the Federal Sector
The federal government employs several different systems to determine pay.
Slightly under one half of all federal civilian employees (mostly white collar)
are classified under the General Service (GS) pay schedule. Another fifth
(mostly blue collar) fall under the Federal Wage System (FWS). Remaining
workers are covered by the Postal Service Schedule or one of several smaller pay
plans for other agencies.
Eachof the major federal pay systems is linked to private sector rates of
pay. Reasons for doing so are set forth in the Federal Salary Reform Act of
1962which established the comparability principle for workers covered by the
GS:
"Adoptionof the principle of comparability will insure
equity for the federal employee with his equals
throughout thenational economy - enablethegovernment
tocompete fairly with private firms for qualified
personnel —andprovide at last a logical and factual
standard for setting Federal Salaries." (reprinted in
President's Panel (1976), p. 8)
Having set this objective, an elaborate mechanism was established to
annuallyadjust federal pay to private pay rates. In March of each year the
Bureau of Labor Statistics undertakes a national white collar salary survey.—6-
This information is used to assign rates of pay to jobs in the public sector
such that federal pay rates are comparable to "private enterprise pay rates for
the same levels of work."3 A number of factors interfere with pursuit of this
objective. First, it is often difficult to compare jobs in the public sector
with jobs in the private sector (air traffic controllers, judges, etc.). Second,
there are a number of technical problems with the BLS survey that may make the
private sector comparison group a biased sample of all private sector workers.4
Finally, in nine of the past 13 years, and not since 1976, have the pay raises
suggested by the technical analyses been fully accepted by the executive and
legislative branches. As a consequence there is good reason to suspect the
comparability process may have strayed from its objective.
Although in principle federal wage schedules assign rates of pay to jobs
not individuals, application of the system provides some flexibility to tailor
compensation to fit individuals. To attract or retain workers, while remaining
within the confines of the GS or FWS, federal employers can reclassify jobs
upward (grade creep), speed up promotions, lower credentials for jobs, or give
unduely large credit to previous work experience. In addition, upper level
managers are eligible for merit pay bonuses. Borjas (1980) present some
evidence on wage variation within the federal sector.
3. The Wage Regression Approach
The wage regression approach used by both Smith and Quinn, has previously
been applied to race and sex differentials. An important distinction between
these applications and the present application is that sectoral attachment,
unlike race and sex, is a "choice" variable. The method compares earnings or
wages between similar workers in each sector. It poses the hypothetical
question: "What would a person with some given set of observed characteristics—7-
(education, sex, race, etc.) earn in each sector?" Unexplained or residual
differences in pay between sectors are interpreted as quasi-rents to employment
in the higher paying sector.
A serious empirical problem arises because choices not taken are not
observed. Associated with each worker is a public sector wage or a private
sector wage, but never both. The wage a private sector worker would earn if he
were to obtain a public sector job is not observed, nor is the wage a government
worker would earn in a private sector job. Direct wage comparisons are
impossible. The best one can do is somehow impute an alternative wage for each
worker. Inevitably this requires basing the analysis on workers employed in one
sector or the other.
Smith and Quinn perform these imputations using the results of OLS wage
equations fitted to each sector. Parameter estimates based on employed private
sector workers are used to predict what "public sector workers would earn in the
private sector."5 The portion of the wage differential that cannot be explained
by differences in measured characteristics between workers in each sector is
interpreted as the extent of overpayment: a quasi-rent to employment in the
higher paying sector.
Such an interpretation, however, hinges on two crucial assumptions. First,
the disturbances in each wage equation are classically behaved. This assumption
implies that given observed personal characteristics, workers are randomly
distributed across sectors. Yet this restriction may be inconsistent with even
the simplest models of employee and employer behavior which suggest sectoral
attachment is a choice variable. Each employment match is the end result of a
search process in which employees attempt to choose the job offering the
greatest net advantage and employers try to obtain labor at the lowest cost.
Many, if not most, of the factors involved in these choices (worker and employer
preferences, job attributes, worker quality, etc.) are measured only-8-
imperfectly. If the matching process is effective we expect, say, a worker with
unobserved skills valued most in one sector to be observed working in that
sector. Thus self (or firm) selected samples, which imply different unobserved
productivity characteristics of workers in each sector, may provide an
alternative explanation of residual wage differences predicted by the wage
regression technique.
The second assumption crucial to the Smith-Quinn interpretation is that pay
oifferentials do not represent equalizing differences for nonpecuniary job
attributes of each sector. If workers view the federal and private sectors as
offering fundamentally different quantities of important nonwage job attributes,
then workers will, in general, not face the same wage offers from each sector.
The worker side of an employer-employee match suggests workers desire employment
in the sector offering the most advantageous package of job attributes and
wages.For some workers higher public sector wages may not be enough to offset
dissatisfaction with nonwage aspects of public sector jobs. Other workers may
view public sector jobs more favorably.
In a competitive labor market distributions of preferences across workers
and nonwage attributes across jobs together determine the market tradeoff
between coniponentsof the total (pecuniary and nonpecuniary) compensation
package.6 The presumption of "equilibrium" that permits interpretation of
market tradeoffs as equalizing differences in pay is open to question in the
public sector. Thus without the "equilibrum" assumption it is difficult to
distinguish equalizing differences from noncompetitive quasi—rents.
The above arguments suggest wage differences between the public and private
sectors can be decomposed into four "sources": a) observed productivity or skill
differences, b) unobserved productivity or skill differences, c) equalizing
differences in pay for nonpecuniary job attributes, and d) quasi—rents or-9-
overpayment by government employers. The Smith-Quinn application of the wage
regression approach is directed towards the distinction between a) and d), but
their framework can be modified to also consider b) and c). Let the (log) wage
offer to the th individual by the jth sector (federal or private) be given by:
(1) W = + If?+a3+ j=f,p
where Z is a vector of individual productivity characteristics, and and
are vectors of sector specific weights. Therepresentthe value of
unobserved (to the analyst) productivity in each sector. Without loss of
generality they are scaled to have zero mean in the population. The
represent the market evaluation of nonwage job attributes in each sector and the
are white noise.
The two assumptions required to interpret the unexplained residual as a
quasi—rent can be more formally stated. Let S1 be a binary variable that takes
on a value of unity if the th individual is observed to be employed in the
federal sector and a value of zero otherwise. The assumption of no worker




The assumption of no equalizing differences in pay implies:
(3) E(a) =E(a)
If both of these assumptions are satisfied then separatewage regressions
estimated on subsamples of public and private sector workers will yield—10—
consistent estimates of and &.Theseparameter estimates can be used to
decompose the observed wage differential into "explained" and "unexplained"
components. This decomposition is generally evaluated at the sample means
(indicated by bars):7
(4) w = - wP=- )'+5f
-p'7.
The first term of the decomposition measures the part of the gross differential
attributable to sectoral differences in the productivity characteristics of
workers. The second term measures the quasi-rent to sectoral attachment.
We consider next the effect of relaxing assumptions (2) and (3) on the
interpretation of the decomposition in (4). First, if workers are sorted
between sectors on the basis of unobserved productivity characteristics,
assumption (2) will be violated. Empirical disturbances for the wage functions
of observed workers in each sector (the estimation subsamples) will include
nonrandomly selected samples from the population distributions of 1.iand31P.
For workers employed in the public sector expected wages are:
f f f E(wis.=1) =Z6 ÷E(ji/S=1),
1 1 —1— 1 1
and for workers in the private sector:
E(wIs=O) =ZI6IJ+E(i.x?/S.=0)
Wage regressions based on samples of observed workers may be misspecified
due to an omitted variable measuring the expected effect of unobserved
productivity characteristics given sectoral choice.8 Estimated ,5J may be
biased. In the context of the wage decomposition discussed above the effects
of omitted productivity will be captured by the unexplained component—11—
-P).Unobserved productivity differences between workers in
each sector may account for what previously appeared to be quasi-rents. Thus if
assumption (2) does not hold consistent estimates of J can only be obtained
by jointly considering the wage and sector choice (S1=O,1) functions.
A more difficult problem to deal with is the presence of unmeasuredjob
attributes. The aJ in equation (1) represent market tradeoffs betweenwage
offers and nonpecuniary job attributes in each sector.9 Ignoringcomplications
due to unobserved productivity, violation of the "no equalizing differences"
assumption (3) yields a wage decomposition:
=-= (f- ÷ (- +(a
-ar).
The part of the gross differential not explained by differences in
productive characteristics is comprised of "overpayment" of (1 -'Zand
the market value of nonwage job attributes (a -aP).The coefficients on
the intercepts in the wage regression model will capture -ar),but because
the difference in intercepts depends on the scaling and measurement of the Z
variables, one cannot retrieve -a)(see Jones (1983)). Thus equalizing
differences may also account for what previously appeared to be quasi—rents to
sectoral attachment.
The troublesome effects of unobserved productivity characteristics (ii)and
equalizing differences (aJ) both arise from the sorting of workers between
sectors. In the unobserved productivity case, workers end up in the sector
yielding the greatest return to unobserved skills, all else constant. In the
equalizing differences case workers choose the sector where, say, they "spend"
the least for desirable job attributes. However the two effects are quite
different because payment to the is worker—specific, but payment of a-12-
determined at the market level, is not worker-specific. As a result, the a3
will be independent of sectoral choice at the individual level. Unlike the
troublesome effects of unobserved productivity, joint consideration of
individual sectoral choice and wage offers will not resolve the problem. In the
context of the wage regression approach to differentials, there is no easy way
to separate the effects of equalizing differences from quasi-rents.
4.Queues and the Determination of Federal Employment
The preceeding section suggests the method of wage decomposition often
employed to analyze wage differentials may fail to disentangle quasi-rents to
employment in the government sector from the effects of either unobserved
productivity characteristics or equalizing differences in pay. We consider an
alternative approach to this problem. The approach is motivated by the simple
supply argument that appears to be the original objective of comparability
legislation: a cost—minimizing federal employer would set wages no higher than
necessary to attract the required work force. If wages are above this level the
government "overpays". Workers seeking quasi-rents to government employment
will queue up for federal jobs.
Evidence of queues is our indicator of overpayment. As a practical matter
the length and composition of these queues will rarely be observed. It is
likely that many workers who desire federal jobs at current relative wages are
employed in the private sector and never formally seek employment. To determine
whether the federal government overpays, we need to identify these workers.
In the absence of direct observation of worker preferences for federal
sector employment we develop below a simple model of the "matching" or sorting
process between workers and employers. The model is used to determine the
length and composition of queues. An additional advantage in that the selection-13-
mechanism central to this model enables us to adjust wage regressions for the
biasing effects of unobserved productivity characteristics.
The model contains two sectors (public and private) andmany workers. To
focus attention on the fundamental differences between sectors (job security,
unique nature of public service, bureaucratic work environment, etc.) we assume
all employers within each sector are homogeneous. According to our
characterization, certain nonwage job attributes are intrinsic to the government
in its capacity as employer. These attributes are thus considered fixed —
neithersector can provide the unique attributes of the other sector at any
cost. It follows that employers in each sector are primarily concerned with
wage offers (given the market value of job attributes) rather than manipulating
packages of wages and job attributes.
Unlike employers, who are of only two types, workers have heterogeneous
tastes and preferences. Associated with each sector is a wage structure that
relates the wage offered each worker to the worker1s bundle of productivity
characteristics. We assume all workers are aware of the best wage offers they
could obtain in each sector. We focus on two choices; one by employees and one
by employers.
First, at the prevailing public-private relative wage workers decide
whether they prefer public or private sector employment. At the same time
federal employers, perhaps anticipating queues for jobs, decide how they will
select workers from the pool of potential employees demanding jobs. Given
exogenous (legislated) levels of both employment and the federal wage scale,
employers adopt a set of hiring standards to ration workers from the queue.'°
A worker will be employed in a particular sector if the worker both desires
employment in that sector and the sector chooses to hire the worker. In
addition, some workers may be either unemployed or out of the labor force.In
the present analysis we deal only with employed persons. Moreover, we assume—14—
all workers can obtain a job in the private sector if needed, althoughmany of
these workers may prefer employment in the public sector. This assumption is
consistent with the presumption of implicit queues for government jobs, that is,
many private sector workers may prefer federal sector jobs at current relative
wages between the sectors.
We call the sector preference decision of workers the "job acceptance"
decision because it implicitly answers the hypothetical question: "Would the
individual accept a federal sector job if offered (at some specified relative
wage)?" We denote the employer decision to ration employment the "job offer"
decision because it implicitly answers the hypothetical question: "Would the
federal sector offer this individual a job if the individual applied?" The job
acceptance decision is based on a utility comparison between packages of wages
and nonwage job attributes offered by each sector. The job offer decision
follows from cost minimizing behavior by employers. In particular, the federal
sector attempts to select those workers from the queue (identified by
productivity characteristics) that are most productive given the wage the
federal sector must offer.
It is also important to recognize the hiring standards employed by the
federal sector at a point in time are derived from a single point on the public
sector demand curve for labor. At this point the wage is above the
"competitive" level and queues result. The job offer decision summarizes how
workers are chosen from the queues. At other points on the public sector demand
curve -representingsay, alternative budgets specifying different wage and
employment levels -differenthiring standards will be in effect.
This rather narrow formulation of the job offer decision is the consequence
of not modelling the general equilibrium determination of public and private
sector wages at the macro level. Thus one must bear in mind the hiring
standards we specify may be useful predictions of the likelihood of choosing a—15-
marginal worker from the queue, but the same hiring standards would be
inappropriate for nonmarginal changes in any of the factors that affect the
length of the queue."
More formally we consider first the worker, or job acceptance side of the
employment match. For each individual the decision to seek work in a particular
sector will depend on the worker's evaluation of nonwage job attributes offered
hnd on the potential wage that could be earned in each sector. The federal
sector is fundamentally different from the private sector due to certain nonwage
aspects of the job. Workers with different characteristics may vary in their
evaluation of the nonwage aspects of each sector. These heterogeneous
preferences may, in part, be represented by worker characteristics X. Worker
choice between sectors also depends on relative wages. We denote the log wage
differential between sectors as where and w are the log wage offers
individual i would receive should the individual obtain employment in the
federal (f) or private (p) sectors. We represent worker preference or desire
for employment in each sector by h1! and h where:'2





The Bi indicate the relationship between measured characteristics and tastes for
work in each sector. The measure the sensitivity of worker sectoral choice
to the relative wage differential. Thus the s and a's together characterize
each individual's evaluation of job packages offered by each sector. The e3
represent unobserved worker heterogeneity.
From equation (5) it follows that an individual will desire to work in the
federal sector if h -h>0. Let P1 =h-hbe:—16—
p1 = - P)+(a
-a)(w
-w)+e-e)
(6) f = + c1(w — w)÷
e1.
If sectoral attachment was purely a supply decision then this equation would
determine sectoral choice. However the proportion of workers desiring federal
employment may exceed the number of jobs available in the government sector.
For example, a private sector worker may be qualified for and desire a Post
Office job at some favorable (to the worker) w-wP, yet the worker can do no
more than queue up for the job.
To determine observed sectoral attachment we need to bring in the employer
or job offer side of each match. At issue are the standards used by the federal
sector to ration the queue of potential employees. We assume the objective of
the federal sector is to maximize worker productivity per dollar spent on labor
input. Towards this end we define a job offer function that evaluates each
potential employee by productivity characteristics (X2) and the absolute cost
Let P2 be an index of the desirability of a worker to the federal
government:
(7) P =XB ÷w +e,
2-2-2 2 2
The matching process that generates observed sectoral attachment can now be
made more explicit. Since neither P1 nor P2 are directly observed we can
arbitrarily scale each such that P>O indicates a worker will accept a public
sector job (j=1) or the government will hire the worker (j=2) andP￿O indicates
the workers does not desire a public sector job (j=1) or will not be hired
(j=2). Then, a worker is employed in the federal sector with probability:—17—
(8) P* =
Prob[P1>O,P2>O].
We emphasize that the functionsP1(') and P2(.) are pppulation
relationships in the above model. All workers have relative preferences for
federal versus private sector work and the public sector can potentially
evaluate all workers. P1 tells us which workers implicitly enter the queue and
P2 indicates which individuals will be chosen.13 Some workers that would be
acceptable to the federal government do not desire federal employment and thus
remain in the private sector. Similarly, many private sector workers may desire
employment in the federal sector but are never hired.It is in this spirit that
we refer to P1(.) as the "job acceptance" decision (would the individual accept
a federal sector job if offered?) and P2(.) as the "job offer" decision (would
the federal sector hire an individual if that individual were toappear in the
queue?).
5. Estimation Issues
Equation (8) indicates an individual will be observed to be employed in the
federal sector with bivariate probability Theprobability of observing an
individual to be employed in the private sector is 1-P. If both w and w are
known for each worker and e1 ande2 are distributed joint normal the parameters
of P1 and P2 can be estimated directly.14
Poirier (1980) has shown that identification can be achieved through a
single exclusion restriction. The problem is one of choosing variables that
determine either the job acceptance or job offer decisions, but not both. As a
practical matter we feel there are several defensible restrictions we can
impose. However, rather than relying solely on exclusion restriction we also-18—
tap an additional source of identification by using information on prior
employment status of individuals.
Let S1 and St indicate employment status in periods t-1 and t
respectively, where S=0 indicates private sector attachment and S=l indicates
federal sector attachment. Further identification is provided by assuming all
workers with federal sector jobs in period t-1 may, if they choose, remain
employed in the federal sector in period t, that is, all federal sector
separations are voluntary. Evidence for 1982, the year of our data, provides
support for this assumption. For example, Executive branch employment dropped
by over 113,000 in the first two years of the Reagan Administration. Over 90
percent of this reduction was achieved through normal processes of attrition
(and early retirement) rather than by reduction-in-force procedures
(separations, downgrades, or lateral reassignments).15
Let ir1 be the probability of observing an individual with employment
pattern St_l=m and S=n. The above assumption implies the likelihood an
individual will be observed to make the {Sti=1, S=O} transition is the joint





For the individual known to make this transition other combinations of job
acceptance and offer decisions resulting in private employment ((P1>0, P2￿0) and
(P1￿0, are assumed to occur with zero probability.
The likelihoods of observing remaining transition patterns of employment
are unaffected by the assumption. We have:—19—
00 =






For workers in the federal sector in period t we cannot distinguish between
transitions (S_1=0, S=1} and {St_1=1, St=i}, so 0111 Wowever for
workers in the private sector in period t we can distinguish between those
employed in the government sector in the prior period (1110) and those not
employed in the private sector in the prior period (ir00).
Both wage offers and w enter each of the ir.Upto this point we have
considered them known. Although individual workers may be aware of wage offers
in each sector, the observed data contain one or the other. We deal with this
problem by explicitly incorporating these wage offers in the model. To do so, a
slight reparameterization is useful. Let = and = Z'5P. Then
equations (1), (6), and (7) can be rewritten (omitting individual subscripts)
as:













The unidentified a are captured by coefficients on the intercept contained in
Z. To maintain full generality the reduced form disturbances are jointly
distributed with density f(E1, E2,
Weare now able to derive the likelihood function of the sample. Using our
earlier classification scheme we can partition sample observations into, three
categories. These categories and the contribution of each to the likelihood
function of the sample are:








3) Private sector workers with no prior federal sector status:
0O =1-Pr[P>0, P >0, wP -P].
Since and wP are never both observed for the same individual each of these
expressions is based on trivatiate density derived from f() by "integrating
out" either s3or .Forexample, rr1°isbased on the density:-21-
g(E1, 2' E4) = ff(•)dE3,






Remaining probabilities are based on similar expressions.
Let n1, n2, n3 refer to the subsarnples of observations from the appropriate
categories. The natural log of the likelihood function of the sample is:
L =Zlog(ir1) +Elog(ir10) +Zlog(w00)
n3
where 1=0111 The model described by this likelihood functionmay be
considered an endogenous switching model with a bivariate regime classification
function.
The joint density f(-) is assumed joint normal with mean vector zero and
covariance matrix with typical element Following the conventional probit
normalization we set 011=022=1. Because and are never jointly observed,
034isnot identified in this model. The parameter vector is thus:
=
{81,82,1,2,,6P,012,013,01402302403301
The likelihood function is maximized with respect to cusinga modified scoring
algorithm proposed by Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974).
6. Data
The primary data source used for estimation is the Current Population
Survey (CPS) for the second quarter (April, May, June) of 1982. This source has
several advantages over other surveys. Sampling procedures based on rotation—22-
groups make it possible to match respondents in adjacent years. This permits
creation of the large longitudinal file we need to classify observations by
previous period employment status.17 Another advantage over other longitudinal
data files (NLS,PSID) is the CPS provides detailed information on the level
(federal, state, or local) of government.18
The data used include all respondents who worked in either the federal or
private sectors in 1981 and also worked in either the federal or private sectors
in 1982. Any individual that did not work in either year, or worked in state or
local government in either year is excluded. Although we recognize these
exclusion restrictions are not exogenous, the costs of taking explicit account
of them are prohibitive.
The sample contains 6064 men and 4561 women. Summary statistics for these
data are contained in Table 1. Definitions of most variables are obvious. The
dependent variable is the natural log of the hourly wage rate calculated by
dividing usual weekly earnings by usual hours worked per week. Region variables
are based on census definitions and unemployment rates are at the state level.
The variable "Percent Federal Employment" is an index of the federal presence in
each state obtained by dividing federal civilian employment by total employment
in each state. Finally, the variable "Years of Potential Experience" is
calculated as age minus schooling minus five.
One potentially important variable not included in our analysis is union
status. This exclusion may be defended on grounds that it is preferable to let
union effects implicitly enter the model in reduced form rather than deal
directly with the endogeneity of union status. In any event, the absence of
information on collective bargaining prohibited the analysis of union status.'9-23-
7. Results
7.A Parameter Estimates
Equation (6) suggests an individual's desire for employment in the public
sector will depend on relative wage offers (wt- w). According to this
formulation a percentage increase in w will have the same effect as a
percentage decrease of the same percentage magnitude in w. However, an
empirical problem arises because of the omission of relevant information on
pensions and other nonwage forms of pecuniary compensation. Theory suggests an
inverse relationship between wages and fringes in the compensation package.
This prediction has received little empirical support (see Smith an Ehrenberg
(1983)). Instead, evidence indicates the public sector (or high wage employers
in general) may offer workers both high wages and attractive fringes.20
Moreover, the pension component of the compensation package is often an
actuarial (frequently linear) function of wage payments. This suggests workers
will not be indifferent between changes in relative wages due to changes in
federal sector (high fringe) wages on the one hand and private sector wages (low
fringe) on the other. To allow for this possibility we generalize our empirical
formulation of the job acceptance decision to permit asymmetric responses to
public and private sectorwages:
(6')
Parameter estimates for this version of the model are presented in Table 2
for males and Table 3 for females. The first two columns of each table present
results for the job acceptance (P1) and job offer(P2) equations. Remaining
columns contain estimated wage functions for the federal sector (wv) and private
sector (wP). Estimates of the are presented at the bottom of each table.
We first consider estimates for the job offer and acceptance decisions for
males. Since most of the individual parameters are not of primary interest we—24—
will be brief. Higher federal sector wage offers increase the probability a
worker will desire to work in the public sector but decrease the likelihood the
worker will be hired. Worker preference for the public sector decreases with
the private sector wage offer. Comparison of 4and suggests worker choice
is more sensitive to federal wages than to private sector wages. This
difference may, as the discussion above indicated, reflect more generous fringe
benefits in the federal sector.
Other estimates reveal married or previously married individuals are more
likely to desire employment in the federal sector than never married
individuals. Nonwhites are less likely to desire government employment but more
likely to receive a public sector job offer. Workers in the South are both less
likely to want and less likely to be offered federal jobs. The coefficient on
the federal employment variable indicates federal presence in a state strongly
increases the likelihood of a federal job offer.
We present the estimated wage functions for males in columns 3 and 4 of
Table 2. Most, parameters of the wage functions are precisely measured. The
estimated covariance parameters indicate wages and the matching process are not
independent. This suggests OLS estimates of sectoral wage functions may be
biased. We make some comparisons with OLS to investigate the extent of this
bias in subsection 7.C.
The parameter estimates indicate wage functions in the federal and private
sectors are slightly different in several respects. Nonwhites have a
(insignificant) wage advantage in the federal sector but a wage disadvantage in
the private sector. Federal wages appear to be lower outside of the South
(which includes Washington, D.C.) but private sector wages are higher in all
regions other than the South. The estimates indicate an additional year of
education adds 3.7 percent to wages in the federal sector and 4.5 percent in the
private sector (evaluated at means). An additional year of potential experience—25—
adds about 1.1 percent to wages in each sector.
For females the estimated ce's again have the expected signs. Most of the
other coefficients in the job offer, acceptance, and wage equations are of the
same sign and approximate magnitude as the coefficients for males. A notable
exception is the curious effect of education on the probability an individual
will be offered a public sector job. For both males and females an additional
year of education has the same effect on the job offer probability evaluated of
mean (12.6) years of schooling. However additional years of schooling beyond
the sample mean have much larger positive effects on the job offer probability
for men than for women. Indeed, for women the effect of an additional year of
schooling turns negative at slightly under 15 years of schooling.
7.8 Direct Wage Comparisons
The advantage of joint estimation of wage offer functions and the sectoral
choice mechanism in that the biasing effect of unobserved worker quality is
eliminated. As Section 3 argued, the resulting "unexplained" wage differences
may represent the combined effects of government payment of quasi-rents and
equalizing differences. Direct wage comparisons cannot distinguish between
these effects. However, "equal" wage structures is itself a current policy goal
so these wage comparisons indicate how this goal has been met.
Before considering the estimates it is useful to clarify a problem of
interpretation of direct wage comparisons. "Equal" wage structures is taken to
mean a randomly chosen individual will face identical wage offers from each
sector =Q?).Thisdefinition of "equalt' wages implicitly takes a wage
function based on all private sector workers as the standard of comparison.
Whether this should be so is a policy issue we do not address here. Previous
analyses (Smith, Quinn) have used the average wage of all private sector workers
as the standard and, to compare our findings with theirs, we continue this—26—
tradition. However, one may argue the "correct" comparison group should include
state and local employees, or be limited to the unionized private sector, be
restricted to large private employers, or contain only white males. Indeed, the
puzzling question of why survey evidence used in federal wage policy (the PATC
Survey) suggests federal workers are "underpaid", yet estimates based on the CPS
samples indicate federal workers are "overpaid" may be the result of different
comparison groups (see Freeman (1984)).In any event, the standard used in this
section is the wage function of a random sample of all private sector workers.
Our primary concern is the effect of observed and unobserved productivity
characteristics on sectoral wage differences.
Predicted percentage wage differences between the federal and private
sectors are presented in Table 421 The first row gives mean differences for
each sex. In our sample males in the federal sector average 32.8 percent more
and females 38.7 percent more than their counterparts in the private sector.
The second row of Table 4 presents estimated federal—private differentials
"adjusted" for differences in observed productivity related characteristics of
workers in each sector. These estimates, based on the wage regression approach,
indicate almost two—thirds of the male gross differential can be attributed to
observed individual differences. The analogous figure for females is about 40
percent. Finally, parameter estimates from the model jointly estimating wage
functions and the sectoral choice mechanism (row 4) suggest the "unexplained"
wage difference is 4.2 percent for males and 22.1 percent for females.22
It is interesting to compare these findings to the most recent published
results (using 1978 data )ofSmith (1981). Employing the wage regression
technique she finds a wage advantage of 10 to 11 percent for males and 20 to 21
percentfor females. These figures are remarkably close to our reported OLS
results in row 2ofTable 4.However,animportantdifference between these—27—
findings and those of Smith is she specified her wage equations with 12
variables (mostly quadratic and product terms involving experience, education,
and marital status) not included in our specification. Row 3 of Table 4
presents the results of adding most of these same variables to our OLS wage
functions. The wage advantage increases slightly to 12.1 percent for males and
drops to 20.3 percent for females.
The comparison between rows 2 and 3 suggests wage regression estimates of
the wage advantage may not be very sensitive to omitted variables. (many of the
variables included in row 3 but not in row 2 are highly significant.) Therefore
it is a bit surprising that the maximum likelihood (ML) correction for
unobservables further reduces the wage advantage for males. Although
computation costs prohibited inclusion of a variable list as exhaustive as
Smith's in our ML model, the OLS results suggest the addition of these variables
would probably have little effect. Thus observed wage differences appear to be
attributable to unobserved as well as observed productivity differences for
males, but for females the effect of unobserved characteristics is apparently
nil.
7.C Simulated Probabilities and Queues
If employers pay no equalizing differences for sectoral differences in
nonwage job attributes the above figures represent our best estimates of the
federal—private wage advantage. If this is not the case, we need an alternative
indicator of the "comparability" of wages. One such indicator is the length of
queues for federal sector jobs.
Recall that neither the job acceptance nor the job offer decisions are
directly observed. We can use the parameter estimates of the model to simulate
these events. In Table 5 we present predicted marginal probabilities of job
acceptance and job offer. These predictions are obtained by calculating-28-
probabilities for each member of the sample and then averaging.
The first entry in this table indicates the average predicted probability
of job acceptance of males in the sample was 0.18.23 Our interpretation is
that 18 percent of all sample men would accept a federal sector job if offered.
The analogous figure for females is a bit higher, about 29 percent. This
suggests that federal-private wage differentials are more attractive to women in
this sample.
The job offer probabilities presented in the second row indicate 83percent
of all males would be acceptable to federal employers, but only 67 percent of
females would be hired. This reflects the expected "reverse" sorting in the
matching process, that is, most measured personal characteristics have opposite
effects in the acceptance and offer decisions. In addition, the estimated
correlations between unobserved factors entering each decision are also negative
(-0.87 for males and -0.92 for females). Thus those individuals most likely to
desire a federal sector job are also least likely to be offered a federal
sector job. This pattern is most striking when the joint probability ofbeing
offered a job and accepting a job (the probability of being employed in the
federal sector) is considered. If joining the queue (job acceptance) and being
chosen from the queue (job offer) were independent, the probability of observing
a worker in the federal sector would simply be the product of marginal
probabilities: 0.134 for males and 0.160 for females.24 However neither the
acceptance nor offer decisions are pure random behavior, so the predicted joint
probability based on the negative estimated correlation is 0.064 for males and
0.047 for females (row 3).
These simulated probabilities provide useful new information about the
matching process. Yet they do not say much about whether wages are "comparable"
between sectors. We can attempt to answer this more difficult question by-29-
noting that if the public-private wage differential observed in the sample
exceeds the equalizing difference that must be paid to attract workers to the
federal sector, then queues for federal sector jobs will result. If we ignore
worker quality and concentrate on numbers of workers we are able to obtain an
informal measure of the length of the queue by comparing the fraction of the
workforce desiring government employment (at sample wages) to the fraction that
is employed in the federal sector.
This indicator of the length of the queue, calculated as
Pr(P1>O)/Pr(P1>O,P9>O) is presented in the last row of Table 5. This expression
is the inverse of the probability that a worker desiring a federal sector job
will be chosen from the implicit queue. Roughly three times as many men would
be willing to work at the sample wage differential as will be hired at that
differential. The analogous figure for women is double that of men.
7.D. An Alternative Indicator of Comparability
An alternative approach to comparability can be based on a simple supply
argument: a cost-minimizing federal employer would pay wages no higher than
necessary to attract the required workforce and eliminate the queues
described above. This approach has considerable theoretical appeal.In
particular, the inability of the wage regression approach to distinguish between
payment of rents and payment of equalizing differences for job attributes is no
longer a problem because each individual's choice of sector is based on an
implicit valuation of both the wage and ronwage aspects of jobs.
This supply principle can be made operational by using the parameter
estimates obtained in section 6 to simulate the employment effects of changes in
federal wages. To simplify matters we consider only policies that alter federal
wages by the same percentage amount for all individuals. Other policies that
alter the return to individual attributes or otherwise result in different-30-
percentage changes across individuals are not considered. In the notation of
the wage offer functions discussed earlier, all changes in federal wages are
obtained by altering the intercept.
Let be the proportion of male (or female) workers employed in the federal
sector. The probability of job acceptance can be rewritten (using equation
(6')) as:
fAf pp (12) =FIX8+ a (w+k+a w1
11 —1i•—1 1' 1
' 1i•
where F[.] denotes the normal distribution function and the new term, k,
approximates a constant (across individuals) percentage change in the federal
wage offer.
Given the parameter estimates we can use (12) to simulate the number of
persons desiring employment in the government sector for any change in federal
wage offers. In particular, the federal wage reduction that eliminates queues
given ty the k that satisfies 1/N P =Z. Thisprocedure yields values of
i=1 ii
kof about minus 16 percent for males and minus 42 percent for females. This
suggests the federal government could continue to attract a workforce of current
size with substantially lower wages.
Several important issues are raised by these figures. First, since the
simulation procedure fixes the level of employment but not labor "quality," one
consequence of lower federal wages may be deterioration of the quality of the
federal workforce. The severity of this problem depends on the relative
importance of the federal wage structure (wi) and hiring standards (P1) in
determining who enters and is chosen from queues. As an empirical matter the
"quality" effect has been minimized by considering only constant percentage
changes in wages. Apparently the number of individuals desiring employment in-31-
the federal sector is primarily a function of the wage level, and the 'quality"
(attributes) of individuals desiring federal employment is more strongly related
to the wage structure (the relative valuation of individual attributes by each
sector). A comparison of simulated workforces before and after the wage
reduction indicates the quality problem is not severe. For example, the 16
percent wage reduction for males will reduce the average level of education of
the male federal workforce from 13.9 years to 13.8 years. Comparable figures
based on the 42 percent wage reduction for women are 13.1 and 12.8. Levels of
work experience were slightly higher for the lOW wage federal workforce than for
the high wage workforce.
Another issue is the particularly large response for women. Perhaps the
most likely explanation is our choice of a private sector comparison group (see
the discussion in Section 7.B). If the private sector is imperfect (unions,
discrimination, monopoly, etc.) the wage the government must offer to attract
workers will be affected. For instance, if there exists sex or race
discrimination in the private sector, the price the federal sector must pay for
its work force will be lower. Although payment of these lower wages may be cost
effective given the imperfections in the private sector, it may be legally or
politically inappropriate for the federal government to simply match (or
slightly exceed) discriminatory wages. Thus perhaps some of the apparent
government wage advantage, particularly for females, can be attribute to
imperfections in the private sector labor market. Our results may indicate the
private sector "underpays" certain groups of workers.
Finally, two additional limitations of the model may also be relevant.
First, some of the assumptions required to calculate k are not likely to be
satisfied. In particular, we have implicitly assumed the demand curve for
public employees is perfectly inelastic: as relative wages change the "target"
employment levelremains fixed. Finally, we note once again that the role of-32-
pensions in the public sector may complicate our interpretation of relative wage
differences.
8. Summary
Our empirical effort is directed towards two goals. First, we seek to
determine if wage structures in the federal and private sectors have been
"equal ized by the federal comparability process. Our second goal is to develop
a more choice-theoretic approach to the issue of wage comparability. A
difficulty with previous work is that when markets do not clear, as is likely to
be the case for the public sector, the conventional wage regression approach to
comparability is unable to distinguish equalizing differences from quasi-rents.
Explicit modelling of worker and employer choices appears to be an appealing
alternative.
With respect to the first goal, a comparison of 1982 wages for federal
workers and all private sector workers suggests wages were not equal. Although
much of the gross differential in average wages can be explained by differences
in observed and unobserved attributes of workers in each sector, federal sector
wage advantages of about 4 percent for males and 22 percent for females remained
unexplained.
With respect to the second goal we formulate and estimate a model
permitting prediction of the wage differential that eliminates implicit queues
for federal sector jobs. The estimates suggest the elimination of queues will
require substantial reductions in federal wages for both sexes. Subject to
limitations detailed in 7, the simulations suggest the federal sector is able to
attract a workforce of current size and roughly current "quality0 by offering
average wages 16percentlower for men and42percent lower for women.-33—
Footnotes
1
Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962.
2lhis is the standard method ofestimating equalizing differences in the
private sector where observed wage differentials can be assumed to be
"equilibrium" differences. See Smith (1979), Brown (1980), and Duncan and
Holmiund (1983) for examples. Quinn (1979) makes some adjustments for
public-private differences in nonwage job attributes. See also Bellante and
Link (1981)
3See President's Panel(1976), ch. 2. This is a brief description of GS
pay determination. FWS pay rates are set to be "in line with prevailing levels
for comparable work within a local wage area." Postal Service rates are set by
collective bargaining, although "On a standard of comparability to the
compensation and benefits paid for comparable levels of work in the private
sector of the economy."
4See Smith (1977,1982) and President's Panel (1976), Ch. 5. The most
important is the minimum establishment size which leads to oversampling of high
pay employers. Another problem is the lack of information on fringe benefits.
5Alternatively, wage functions can be estimated for public sector employees
and the estimated coefficients can be used to predict what private sector
workers would earn in the public sector. See Smith (1977), p. 49-52.
6See Smith (1979)or Rosen (1983).
7We ignore the index numberproblem of choosing a base.
8See, for example, Heckman (1979).
9The aJsay nothing about individual preferences for wages versus job
attributes unless preferences are homogenous in the population or the particular
individual is at the margin between sectors.
101n the short runwe assume federal employers cannot use the wage
mechanism to shorten the queue. This seems to be an accurate description of pay-34-
proceduresfor lower and middle level jobs, but it may be less valid for upper
level jobs.
11A more elaborate and complete model specifying the mechanismsgoverning
wage adjustments at the macro level is beyond the scope of this paper.
12We omit the individual subscript where no ambiguity will result.
also indicates whether workers who do not enter the queue (P1￿O) would
be chosen were they to enter the queue. Thus P2 should not be interpreted as
conditional on being in the queue.
14Empirical investigations of similar models in whichwages enter in
reduced form are Abowd and Farber (1981) and Farber (1983).
15See U.S. Office of Personnel Management(1983). The assumption is
similar to the "job rights" assumption of Abowd and Farber (1981).
16Although period t-1 employment status is used to classify observations,
we do not condition on prior employment status. Thus all arguments in the
following probability expressions pertain to period t.
17Only about 15 percent of the respondents can be matched across oneyear
(rotation groups four and eight). To obtain a large enough file we combined
three monthly surveys.
18lnformationon level of government has always been collected as part of
the CPS, but until 1979 this information was not available onlysproadically.
Availability of this information gives us a distinct advantage over some
previous efforts using the CPS to analyse federal-private differentials in which
only half of all public sector workers could be identified by industrial
classification.
190ne third of our sample does have recorded union status. These are not
enough observations for a meaningful analysis. Both the rate of unionization
and the nature of unionization differ between the public and private sectors.-35—
Thus unions may offer an "explanation" for noncomparability of wages. See
Ehrenberg and Schwarz (forthcoming).
particular, federal pension contributions measured as a proportion of
wages are several times greater than private sector contributions. See Leonard
(1983) and Smeeding (1983).
21Percentage changes are calculated as (em_i) where m is the difference in
logs.
22The last row of Table 4 is calculatedas =1(1_P)To obtain
the standard error of this estimate we first calculate var(-) =Efrom the
covariance matrix of parameters. The reported standard error is the square root
of X'ZX.
23This probabilitiy is not conditionalon a job offer. Also, all
probabilities are evaluated at the appropriate adjusted sample wage differences.
24The joint probability is calculated for each member of the sample and
then averaged. In a heterogeneous population this joint probability will not
equal the product of the two average marginal probabilities.-36-
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Log Wage: Federal Sector 2.41 .39 2.05 .40
Log Wage:Private Sector 2.13 .50 1.72 .43
Nonwhite .10 .30 .12 .33
Veteran .42 .49
Married .73 .44 .58 .49
Widowed, Divorced or Separated .08 .26 .21 .41
Central City .21 .41 .24 .43
SMSAbut not Central City .37 .48 .34 .47
Northeast .24 .43 .24 .43
North Central .27 .44 .27 .44
West .21 .40 .20 .40
Percent Federal nployinent .03 .06 .03 .07
Unemployment Rate .09 .21 .09 .21
Years of Education 12.64 2.77 12.48 2.30
Years of Potential Experience 21.6613.94 21.20 14.18
Professional .15 .36 .13 .34
Managerial .14 .34 .08 .26
Clerical .09 .28 .42 .49
Craft .27 .44 .03 .17
Operative .21 .41 .14 .35
Laborer .07 .25 .01 .11
Numberofobservations 6064 4561
crnitted Categories are"South"for the regional dummies and "Service" for the
occupational dummies.—40—
Table 2: Parameter Estimates for Malesa
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Job Acceptance Job Offer Federal Private




















Widowed, Div. or Sep. .141
(.128)
Central City .320 —.393
(.114) (.195)


























Percent Fed. nployment - 26.023 - —
(5. 782)
Unemployment Rate -1.383 - .961 .585
(.535) (.277) (.221)













Yrs. of Pot. Experience - .037 .039
(.004) (.001)
(Yrs. of Pot. Experience)2 —.059 —.063
(.007) (.003)—41--
Table 2: Parameter Estimates for Males (cont'd)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Job Acceptance Job Offer Federal Private




















Intercept —4.873 2.668 1.291 .897
(.733) (.823) (.183) (.060)
Covar iance Matrix
JobAcceptance (P1) 1.000
Job Offer (P2) —.868 1.000
(.066)
FederalWage () .053 -.056 .121
(.042) (.037) (.008)
PrivateWage (wv) .081 —.266 .164
(.046) (.048)—42—











standard errors in parentheses
bScaled by 100Variable
-.43—
Table 3: Parameter Estimates for Femalesa
(1) (2)
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates for Females (cont'd)



























Intercept —3.795 —.736 1.647 .955
(.992) (.390) (.246) (.080)
Covariance 4atrix
Job Acceptance (P1) 1.000
Job Offer (P2) -.920 1.000
(.051)
Federal Wage () —.073 .081 .116
(.048) (.043) (.013)
Private Wage (wv) .004 —.146 .135
(.058) (.066) (.055)—45—










a)Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses
b) Scaled by 100—46—
Table4: Predicted Percentage Federal-Private Wage Differencesa














aStandard errors in parentheses.
CAdjusted for observed productivity characteristics listed in
column 3 of Tables 2 and 3.
dAdjusted for observed productivity characteristics listed in
column3 of Tables 2 and 3 and indicators of part—time work,
widowed, divorced, or separated, married, two urbanization
dummies, and five additional product terms between the included
variables.
eAdjusted for observed productivity characteristics listed in column
3 of Tables 2 and 3 andunobservedproductivity differences.—47—
Table 5: Simulated Probabilities
Males Females
(1) Probability of
Job Acceptance (P1) 0.180 0.286
(2)Probability of
Job Offer (P2) 0.829 0.676
(3) Joint Probability of
Enp1oyment Match 0.064 0.047
(4) Length of Queue 2.811 6.107
ln Source: (1): — Pr(P >0) n. 1
i=l
n
(2): EPr(P>0) n. 2
n
(3): EPr(P>0, p >0) n. 1 2
i=1
(4): (1)/(3)